Female labour market participation in Europe: novel evidence on trends and shaping factors by Giovanna Vallanti et al.
Cipollone et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Female labour market participation in Europe:
novel evidence on trends and shaping factors
Angela Cipollone1, Eleonora Patacchini2 and Giovanna Vallanti3*
*Correspondence: gvallanti@luiss.it
3LUISS University, LLEE and CeLEG,
Rome, Italy
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
We investigate the changes in women’s participation patterns across 15 EU countries
over the last 20 years using individual data from ECHP and EUSILC databases. Our
findings show that the observed trends in female participation differ substantially both
across countries and across different groups of women. We explore such heterogeneity
in trends by looking at the effects of policies and labour market institutional factors on
the participation of women with different family and individual characteristics. Our
estimates reveal a role of policies and institutions that is stronger than what has so far
been assessed. Labour market institutions and family-oriented policies explain almost
25% of the actual increase in labour force participation for young women, and more
than 30% for highly educated women. Surprisingly, changes in the institutional and
policy settings contribute less in explaining the participation of low-skilled women. We
also find that reforming the institutional framework towards a model of “flexicure”
labour market is effective in enhancing women labour supply only when deregulation
is accompanied by sufficient social compensation.
JEL Classification: J11, J21, J2
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1 Introduction
The importance given to the protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms in
the European Community Treaties has changed considerably since the European venture
was first launched. Since 1975, a series of directives have broadened the principle of equal-
ity between men and women to cover working conditions, training and promotion, social
security, access to goods and services, maternity protection and parental leave. In 1997,
the Amsterdam Treaty enabled the gender dimension to be integrated into all Commu-
nity policies and established the principle of equal treatment as a fundamental right. Since
then, the Member States have introduced different policies and activities fighting gender
inequalities1.
As a matter of fact, the female participation rate in Europe has increased from around
55% in the early 1990s to more than 66% in 2008. In the same period, female employ-
ment rate has moved in the same direction, by increasing from 49% to 61%. This steady
improvement in women labour market position has led to a significant decline in the
gender employment gap, which has nearly halved since 1990, from more than 25% to
almost 14% in 20082.
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The extent to which reforms and labour market institutions have contributed to such
a pattern is at the forefront of the political debate. Although there is a variety of studies
looking at this issue from different perspectives, the available evidence is still inconclu-
sive (see Costa, 2000 and Del Boca and Locatelli, 2006 for recent reviews). These patterns
could be driven by changes in cultural attitudes towards work especially in countries
where participation is traditionally lower3. Changes in the characteristics of the female
population such as fertility decisions, elderly care responsibilities4, educational choices5
and demographic changes6 could also have impacted these patterns.
Most of the studies looking at the evolution of the employment (or wage) gender gap over
time using individual data focus on a single country only, thus failing to capture important
differences across European countries characterized by different welfare structures and
cultural attitudes towards female labour market participation. Conversely, cross-country
comparisons using aggregate data typically fail to distinguish compositional effects (i.e.
those arising from changes in the socio- demographic characteristics of men and women
over time) and to capture the varying responsiveness of women with different individual
characteristics to changes in the institutional setting (Jaumotte 2003; Genre et al. 2010).
In this paper we combine the micro and macro approaches into a unified empirical
design, by investigating the changes in female participation patterns across 15 EU coun-
tries over the last 20 years using individual data from ECHP and EUSILC databases. There
are two main contributions of our approach. First, we use individual data for an unusu-
ally large set of countries and for a long time period (twenty years). Second, we provide
a quantification of the role of labour market institutional factors which is more precise
than in previous studies.
We begin with an exploratory analysis of the data where individual information is used
to compute aggregate trends. Next, we use a regression analysis to understand whether
the impact of individual characteristics on labour market participation varies across time
and across countries with different welfare regimes. Finally, we further these results by
exploiting a multi-level model specification to appreciate how institutional and policy
factors affect the choice between unpaid family responsibility (child rearing and elderly
care) and paid occupation for women in different age and education groups.
Our findings point towards a strict interplay between individual characteristics and the
institutional and policy setting, revealing a role of institutional factors that is stronger
than what has so far been assessed. According to our results, the attitude to work of young
women with children appears to be favoured by policies aimed at supporting family and
by the expansion of flexible forms of employment (especially in terms of fixed term con-
tracts) to the extent that such forms of employment are not perceived to be of low quality.
Moreover, in line with the flexicurity approach (an integrated strategy to simultaneously
enhance flexibility and security in the labour market), we find that labour market flexibil-
ity is associated with higher female participation only when it is accompanied by a certain
degree of social security.
We finally quantify the extent to which changes in the labour market behaviour of
women with specific characteristics (e.g. young children) can be associated to changes
in policies and institutions. Labour market reforms and changes of social policies pre-
dict almost 25% of the actual increase in labour force participation for young women, and
more than 30% for highly educated women. However, labour market reforms appear less
related to the observed labour market participation of low skilled women. This result is
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apparently in contrast with the existing empirical evidence which shows that less edu-
cated women (with a lower attachment to work) are more responsive to work incentives
created by policy/institutional changes (Del Boca et al. 2009). Nevertheless, we argue that
in many European countries, labour market reforms are associated with a deterioration of
job quality, especially for low educated women, increasing the risk of dropping out from
the labour force7.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevance of the institu-
tional context in shaping female choices between unpaid family responsibility and paid
occupation and define our research questions. Section 3 describes the data and sum-
marizes the large quantity of micro-level information available for different European
countries and across time using synthetic indicators of female labour market perfor-
mance. Section 4 contains the results of a regression analysis of female involvement in the
labour market across time and countries, whereas Section 5 analyses more closely the role
of the labour market institutional framework and social policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Family responsibility, paid work and institutions
A large empirical literature provides evidence that the provision of facilities, parental
leaves and subsidies for day-care spaces and, more generally, policies aimed at alleviat-
ing the financial burden of child-rearing have a positive effect on female labour market
integration by either increasing work attachment (fewer women leaving occupation after
childbirth) or facilitating female re-entry into the labour market as children grow up (see,
e.g., Sànchez-Mangas and Sànchez-Marcos, 2008; Lefebvre et al. 2009).
Unlike research on child care policies, there is still little evidence on the role of elderly
care policies and norms on female attitude to paid work8. Policies and practices favouring
the reconciliation of child care and employment may not be easily transferred to elderly
care. First, caring responsibilities for elderly usually occur at a later phase of work career
than child care. Second, elderly care is less predictable in timing, duration and intensity
(Keck and Saraceno 2010). Theoretically, the presence of monetary subsidies and publicly
financed elderly care services may have a positive effect on the choice of staying in the
labour force. On the other hand, unconditional cash transfers for elderly care, when com-
bined with other sources of income, such as the dependent elderly’s pension, may create
an “incentive trap” by reducing the opportunity cost of informal care, thereby exerting a
negative impact on labour market participation of low income and low educated women
(Simonazzi 2009)
In addition to fiscal and social policies for the support of working mothers/elderly
carers, the role played by more general changes in the institutional context is gaining
increasing attention in the political debate. In the last two decades, the labour markets
of many European countries have experienced deep changes towards the promotion of a
flexicurity model of labour market with the aim of increasing competitiveness, creating
employment and redistributing work. Though the idea of deregulation was the common
factor behind the waves of reforms, the promotion of flexicurity was pursued through
very different types of interventions on both the flexibility and security side. In the Social
Democratic countries, reforms were mainly aimed at reducing the protection of insid-
ers by lowering the degree of employment protection on regular forms of employment
on the one hand, and increasing income security on the other. In the Southern countries
and some Continental countries, flexibility has been obtained through marginal reforms
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which aimed at deregulating the use of temporary or “atypical” forms of employment
while leaving largely unchanged the legislation applying to the stock of workers employed
under permanent (open-ended) contracts. In other countries, such as the Netherlands,
the emphasis of the reforms was to promote flexible work hours and part-time arrange-
ments. Such reforms can be regarded as beneficial to women to the extent that they
facilitate labour market integration. However, this integration may occur at the risk of
a reinforcement of the traditional separation of gender roles in the labour market and
within the family.
From the flexibility side, the link between labour market deregulation and female par-
ticipation is not clear-cut, though there are a number of empirical studies which show that
the negative effects of strict Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) are dispropor-
tionately larger for those individuals (such as prime-age women) who are more subject to
labour market entry problems. As a result, in a rigid labour market, employment oppor-
tunities for prime age women are significantly reduced because they are more likely than
men to move between employment and inactivity due to the competing demands of work
and family life (OECD 2004; Heckman and Pages 2000). From the security side, whether
or not the presence of a generous system of unemployment benefits accompanied by
active (and activation) policies increases incentives to work largely depends on the eli-
gibility requirements. In many countries, the access to social security and that to active
labour policies are linked and depend on work history (for example, contribution records
showing recent and continuous employment). This requirement may represent a barrier
for women who are more likely to have interrupted careers and to work part-time. This
implies that, while the burden of flexibility is increasingly borne by women, women are
also more likely to be excluded from benefits and active policies. Thus, if women are in
principle supposed to benefit from the combination of flexibility in the labour market and
security in the social system, the tendency towards a more flexible labour market may
exert a negative impact on the incentives to participate when flexible occupations are of
lower quality and poorly securitized.
In this paper, we investigate the role of welfare regime-specific characteristics in
explaining the observed trends in female labour market performance. We model two
dimensions of welfare regimes: (1) the social policies in support to families involved in
informal care, both child-care and elderly care, and (2) the institutional characteristics of
the labour market in terms of the degree of flexibility and security.
More specifically, we test two main hypotheses:
H1 : social policies for the support of families with young children (including
maternity, parental and childcare leaves) and dependent elderly persons positively
correlate with female participation by weakening the trade-off between informal
care and paid work and positively affecting female labour market participation;
H2 : changes in the institutional setting towards a model characterized by lower
barriers to hiring and firing combined with a higher social protection (passive
labour market policies and active labour market policies) positively correlate with
female labour market activity and this correlation is larger for women who are
more involved in family (unpaid) occupations.
We will refer to the variables capturing the characteristics of institutional context and
policies as “macro” factors.
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3 Data and exploratory evidence
3.1 The data
We combine micro data from two different sources, the ECHP (European Community
Household Panel) and the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions), to create a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level
characteristics across countries and over time.
The ECHP micro data is a household survey with a common framework conducted
across the EU-15 Member States under the supervision of Eurostat. The total duration of
the ECHP is 8 years, running from 1994 to 20019. The dataset includes information on
family size and composition, living conditions and several income measures. Therefore,
it provides a source of mutually comparable information at individual level for the EU
member countries at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) is the successor
of the ECHP. The EU-SILC provides harmonized cross-sectional and longitudinal multi-
dimensional micro data on income and social exclusion in the European countries, and it
is the largest comparative survey of European income and living conditions10.
In order to obtain a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level char-
acteristics across the EU countries within the whole period 1994-2009, we limit our
analysis to the EU-15 Member States11. The overall sample includes 1,657,367 individu-
als between 25 and 64 years old of which 851,010 women and 806,357 men. A list of the
variables used in this study, as well as summary statistics for the women and men sam-
ples, are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The employment and participation rates stand at
59% and 66%, respectively, for the female sample, and increase to approximately 80% and
86%, respectively, for the male sample. The percentage of highly educated women and
men (with at least a college degree, "ISCED 6-7") is 27% and women are slightly more
represented than men among the lowest educated individuals (with less than upper sec-
ondary school, "ISCED 0-2"). Over 65% of respondents in both samples declare to live
in-couple. 42% of women and 23% of men live in households with at least one child under
14 years old; 18% of those individuals with children under 14 years old live in house-
holds with at least one pre-school age child. Co-living with elderly (that is, individuals
with 70 years old or more) involves just 6% of all individuals in our sample. Approxi-
mately 28% of those living in couple have a partner with a lower secondary education
(ISCED 0-2), 26% of them have a partner with an upper secondary education (ISCED 3-5),
20% of individuals have a highly educated partner (ISCED 6-7). The variable “cycle” mea-
sures the business cycle frequencies of national GDP over the survey years, 1994-2009.
This variable has been obtained by implementing the filter proposed by Hodrick and
Prescott (1997).
3.2 Amicro-data-based cross country comparison
We begin our analysis by providing some preliminary evidence of the changes in the gen-
der gap in terms of participation and unemployment. Using data from the OECD labour
Force Statistics, Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of activity rates and unemployment
rates in the different European countries separated by gender. Figure 1 points towards
the well-known onset of female labour market participation, especially in countries with
a traditionally low attachment of women to the labour market such as Greece, Ireland,
Italy and Spain. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the unemployment rates do not exhibit
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Table 1 Summary statistics: female sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual characteristics
Employed 851010 0.594 0.491 0 1
Active 851010 0.656 0.475 0 1
Male 851010 0 0 0 0
Age 851010 44.269 11.078 25 64
ISCED02 832447 0.382 0.486 0 1
ISCED35 832447 0.344 0.475 0 1
ISCED67 832447 0.274 0.446 0 1
Single 844864 0.189 0.392 0 1
Incouple 844864 0.687 0.464 0 1
Separated 844864 0.018 0.132 0 1
Divorced 844864 0.067 0.25 0 1
Widowed 844864 0.039 0.193 0 1
Household characteristics
Children 851010 0.713 1.008 0 15
Child 851010 0.422 0.494 0 1
child06 851010 0.179 0.383 0 1
child03 851010 0.096 0.295 0 1
child36 851010 0.113 0.317 0 1
child614 851010 0.259 0.438 0 1
old70 851010 0.06 0.238 0 1
pISCED02 851010 0.276 0.447 0 1
pISCED35 851010 0.258 0.438 0 1
pISCED67 851010 0.198 0.398 0 1
Trend
Year 851010 2003 4.983 1994 2009
Cycle 842730 0.006 1.958 -8.636 4.172
Country of residence
DK 851010 0.044 0.206 0 1
NL 851010 0.07 0.255 0 1
BE 851010 0.045 0.207 0 1
FR 851010 0.074 0.262 0 1
IE 851010 0.043 0.203 0 1
IT 851010 0.156 0.362 0 1
GR 851010 0.06 0.237 0 1
ES 851010 0.111 0.314 0 1
PT 851010 0.054 0.227 0 1
AT 851010 0.043 0.204 0 1
FI 851010 0.068 0.252 0 1
SE 851010 0.048 0.213 0 1
DE 851010 0.087 0.282 0 1
LU 851010 0.035 0.183 0 1
UK 851010 0.062 0.241 0 1
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): upper secondary
education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED67 (pISCED67): tertiary education of the woman (of her partner).
DK-Denmark, NL-Netherlands, BE-Belgium, FR-France, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, GR-Greece, ES-Spain, PT-Portugal, AT-Austria,
FI-Finland, SE-Sweden, DE-Germany, LU-Luxembourg, UK-United Kingdom.
similarly marked trends. This evidence thus seems to suggest that the relevant achieve-
ments of women in terms of labour market performance are to be attributed to the supply
side of the market. In fact, the increase in female activity rate originates from an increase
of female employment due to the increased willingness of women to work rather than
from a decrease in the unemployment rate. However, the relevant question that these
aggregate indicators are not able to answer is how much of these trends can be attributed
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Table 2 Summary statistics: male sample ♥
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual characteristics
Employed 806357 0.797 0.402 0 1
Active 806357 0.857 0.35 0 1
Male 806357 1 0 1 1
Age 806357 44.229 11.137 25 64
ISCED02 788367 0.36 0.48 0 1
ISCED35 788367 0.368 0.482 0 1
ISCED67 788367 0.273 0.445 0 1
Single 799834 0.257 0.437 0 1
Incouple 799834 0.675 0.468 0 1
Separated 799834 0.013 0.112 0 1
Divorced 799834 0.046 0.209 0 1
Widowed 799834 0.01 0.098 0 1
Household characteristics
Children 806357 0.435 0.925 0 14
Child 806357 0.225 0.418 0 1
child06 806357 0.18 0.384 0 1
child03 806357 0.1 0.3 0 1
child36 806357 0.112 0.315 0 1
child614 806357 0.244 0.43 0 1
old70 806357 0.061 0.239 0 1
pISCED02 806357 0.278 0.448 0 1
pISCED35 806357 0.261 0.439 0 1
pISCED67 806357 0.198 0.398 0 1
Trend
Year 806357 2003 4.985 1994 2009
Cycle 798435 0.012 1.959 -8.636 4.172
Country of residence
DK 806357 0.045 0.207 0 1
NL 806357 0.068 0.253 0 1
BE 806357 0.044 0.205 0 1
FR 806357 0.073 0.261 0 1
IE 806357 0.043 0.202 0 1
IT 806357 0.159 0.366 0 1
GR 806357 0.06 0.238 0 1
ES 806357 0.111 0.314 0 1
PT 806357 0.053 0.224 0 1
AT 806357 0.043 0.203 0 1
FI 806357 0.073 0.26 0 1
SE 806357 0.049 0.216 0 1
DE 806357 0.083 0.276 0 1
LU 806357 0.036 0.187 0 1
UK 806357 0.059 0.235 0 1
♥ ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): upper secondary
education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED67 (pISCED67): tertiary education of the woman (of her partner).
♥DK-Denmark, NL-Netherlands, BE-Belgium, FR-France, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, GR-Greece, ES-Spain, PT-Portugal, AT-Austria,
FI-Finland, SE-Sweden, DE-Germany, LU-Luxembourg, UK-United Kingdom.
to forces which are not related to the increased similarity between women and men in
terms of socio- demographic factors such as, for example, education. Such changes in
outcomes over and above those stemming from natural demographic trends across coun-
tries and over time are of particular interest for policy purposes as they might be the
consequence of reforms in the institutional setting.
In our analysis, we use micro data to disentangle aggregate trends into different sources.
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Figure 1 Macro data trends in Europe: Activity rate by gender, 1994-2009. Source: OECD Labour Market
Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/.
Figure 2 Macro data trends in Europe: Unemployment rate by gender, 1994-2009. Source: OECD
Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/.
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We start by looking at the extent to which women differ from men along two differ-
ent labour market indicators (participation and unemployment) across selected European
countries, controlling for the influence of demographic and social characteristics. We use
the methodology introduced by Vidgor (2008) to measure differences between native and
immigrants in US states along cultural and economic lines. Such an approach allows us
to summarize the large quantity of micro-level information available across European
countries and over time in a way that eases cross-country comparisons12. In words, the
procedure predicts which individuals are women on the basis of observed characteris-
tics and then uses this finding to measure the gap between men and women for a chosen
outcome - such as the activity rate - by constructing a numeric index. Such an index
ranges between 0 and 1. It can be interpreted as an index of dissimilarity: the larger the
distance from 1, the more females are different from men along the inspected labour
market indicator, controlling for other individual characteristics. More specifically, we
control for differences in demographic factors using individual information on age and
education level as well as in family structure using marital status, partner education, and
number of children. A value of 1 for the index indicates that, if those characteristics were
equal between men and females, women and men would not differ in terms of the chosen
labour market outcome. Departing from 1 indicates that there are other forces (other than
those stemming from natural demographic trends) which make female labour market
performance worse than that of men.
We construct two different indices capturing gaps between women and men in labour
market participation (activity gap index) and unemployment (gap index for those in the
labour force) (see Appendix A). The activity index captures differences between women
and men inside and outside the labour market, thus revealing behavioural differences
more likely to come from the supply side of the labour market. The unemployment index
focuses on gender differences for the individuals in the labour market only, and hence
captures the behavioural differences more likely to come from the demand side.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results (the complete list of results is collected in Additional
file 1 Tables S1–S2)13. They reveal important cross-country differences in the determi-
nants of the aggregate trends that were not captured in Figures 1 and 2. It appears that
in most of the countries with a significant reduction in the gender gap (such as the
Mediterranean countries, plus Ireland; Figure 1) changes in demographic and social char-
acteristics (i.e. the increasing similarity between women and men in terms of observable
individual characteristics) cannot explain all the shrinking in the gap. Indeed, our corre-
sponding micro-based gender gap indices in Figure 3 remain far from 1, although they
are increasing towards 1 over time. This evidence suggests that there are other forces
which contributed to the observed remarkable increase in female involvement in the
labour market. Similarly, the reduced gender gap in unemployment rates in Spain and the
Netherlands (Figure 2) is associated with significant movements in our micro-based gen-
der gap indices in Figure 4, indicating a limited role for changes in the female labour force
composition. On the other hand, the marked changes in female unemployment in Italy
and Finland (Figure 2) seem to be mainly associated with demographic trends and other
characteristics of the female labour force factors rather than to changes in preferences,
beliefs or labour market policies. Indeed, when controlling for these factors, i.e. when
looking at the results obtained using our indicators in Figure 4, changes in the unemploy-
ment gap between men and women in those countries are not statistically significant.
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Figure 3 Micro-based gender gap index in activity rates, 1994-2009. Source: Own elaborations from
ECHP and EUSILC databases.
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Figure 4 Micro-based gender gap index in unemployment rates, 1994–2009. Source: Own elaborations
from ECHP and EUSILC databases.
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We now focus on the information provided by our different indices. Interestingly, it
shows a feature that is common to most of the European countries: the marked changes
in our micro-based gender gap index in activity rates are associated with a substantial
stability of the same index in unemployment rates. This finding reveals that the observed
changes in unemployment rates (or employment rates for those participating to the labour
force) largely reflect changes in demographic and social factors, whereas other forces
seem to shape female participation rates. This evidence thus seems to provide some
support to the idea that female participation rates are driven by changes in country-
specific characteristics, such as institutional reforms and cultural attitudes towards work.
As stressed in the introduction, the importance of these factors in influencing labour
market performance is gaining attention among economists.
In conclusion, our micro-based gender gap indices in activity and unemployment rates
show a relevant degree of cross-countries heterogeneity in the way the increased similar-
ity between women’s and men’s individual observable characteristics has contributed to
the improvement in female labour market performance. Indeed, while in many countries
the gradual decline of the gender differences in the characteristics of the labour force is
able to explain most of the observed trends, in countries traditionally characterized by a
persistentmale breadwinnermodel, the remarkable increase of female participation in the
labour market must be attributed to country-specific changes in terms of policies, insti-
tutions and cultural attitudes. In Europe, cultural differences across countries are largely
reflected in different welfare regimes. The following section looks in detail at the role
played by the welfare regimes in shaping female labour market behaviour.
4 Female labour market outcomes and welfare regimes
In this section, we evaluate how the probability of participating in the labour market both
over time and across welfare regimes is related to individual characteristics.We estimate a
standard probit model of female labour supply on the whole sample and by welfare regime
and then we interact the main determinants of participation with the trend variable in
order to detect differences in trends for women with different characteristics.
4.1 Cross country differences
Our basic regression model specifies the labour market status as:
ytij = δXtij + γ agetij + λtrendt + σ cycletj + ctyj + εtij (1)
where y is the labour market status (active) at time t for individual (female) i in country
j, age is a dummy for the age group of individual i (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64), cycle is
a business cycle indicator (country specific and time variant), trend is a common linear
trend, cty is a country dummy and X is a set of individual characteristics observed at
time t. Following the existing empirical literature on women labour market participation,
we include controls for the marital status, the level of education, the partner’s level of
education, and for family burden. In particular, besides the traditional controls for family
care involvement such as the presence, the age, and the number of children, we also
include a dummy for the presence in the household of an elderly person above the age of
70 as a proxy for elder care burden. As Ettner (1995) points out, although the decision to
care for a senior person and the decision of fertility differ in many aspects, the influence
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of the commitment to caring for the elderly can be studied similarly to the commitment
towards children14.
In order to investigate the differences in female labour market attitude across countries
under different welfare regimes, we follow the Ferrera (1996) classification and divide the
countries of our sample into four major groups: Southern (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal),
Social Democratic (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Liberal (United Kingdom), and Conti-
nental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxemburg). Table 3
presents the estimation results for the whole pooled sample (15 countries) in column 1
and for each welfare regime separately in columns 2-515,16.
The results in Table 3 show that there are important differences across welfare regimes
in the impact of individual characteristics. Being married is negatively related to women
participation and employment and the effect is stronger in those countries (e.g., Conti-
nental and Southern) characterized by a more traditional family structure. Education is
another important determinant of the female labour market status. As expected, a high
level of education leads to more participation. Further, the educational level of the part-
ner also has a significant impact on female participation. Finally, the age effects show
the familiar hump-shaped pattern in both the participation and employment, implying
an increase in the probability of participating for the age group 35-44, and then a lower
probability for older groups.
Family care burdens are strongly negatively related to female labourmarket involvement
regardless of welfare regime, though with some important differences in the magnitude
of the coefficients. The presence (and the number) of young children exhibits a neg-
ative impact, and this effect is significantly stronger if children are below 4 years old.
Labour market participation increases gradually when the child starts attending school
and the child effect reverses only when she begins secondary school (around age 14)17.
The importance of child age differs across regimes and is most critical in the UK. The
age of the youngest child exerts a less detrimental effect on participation in Southern
countries (which are characterized by lower participation rates for mothers)18; however,
the negative effect persists even when the child is of school age. Indeed, our estimates
show that the probability of participating for women with a child older than 14 (relative
to women without children) is almost 4% lower in the South of Europe than in the Social
Democratic countries, and 3% lower than in Continental countries and the UK.
As for children, elderly care responsibilities are negatively related to female participa-
tion and such a relationship depends on the cultural attitude towards elderly relatives in
different countries. In fact, the estimated coefficient is significantly lower in Southern
countries where cohabiting with an elderly relative is a quite diffuse practice not neces-
sarily related to the need of providing care.
Finally, the highest female participation rate is found among those aged in their late
30s/early 40s in all the welfare regimes groups, and the participation gap between old-
aged women (55-64) and younger groups is significantly larger in Southern countries.
This is explained both by cultural reasons (older women are of a generation in which low
female labour market involvement is part of a male breadwinner system) and by early
retirement pension schemes which favoured early drop outs at least until the late 1990s.
After controlling for personal characteristics and country unobserved time invariant
effects, the trend indicator is positive and significant, implying that, on average, the
probability of being active is 0.18% higher in 2009 than in 1994.
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Table 3 Female activity rate by welfare regimes
All Liberal Continental Democratic Southern
Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err.
Marital status
Single
Incouple -0.071 *** 0.003 -0.009 0.01 -0.098 *** 0.005 -0.022 *** 0.005 -0.109 *** 0.006
Separated 0.057 *** 0.007 0.022 0.018 0.056 *** 0.016 -0.006 0.024 0.1 *** 0.009
Divorced 0.05 *** 0.004 0.036 *** 0.012 0.033 *** 0.006 -0.013 * 0.007 0.125 *** 0.008
Widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 0.019 0.013 -0.1 *** 0.011 -0.021 * 0.013 -0.109 *** 0.009
Children
No children
Children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.027 ** 0.012 -0.036 *** 0.005 -0.036 *** 0.006 -0.039 *** 0.004
Child 0.043 *** 0.005 0.064 *** 0.017 0.061 *** 0.008 0.073 *** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.007
child03 -0.174 *** 0.004 -0.275 *** 0.012 -0.254 *** 0.007 -0.173 *** 0.007 -0.073 *** 0.006
child36 -0.088 *** 0.003 -0.177 *** 0.011 -0.082 *** 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.064 *** 0.005
child614 -0.067 *** 0.003 -0.129 *** 0.008 -0.064 *** 0.005 0.027 *** 0.005 -0.061 *** 0.004
Co-habiting Elderly
No_elderly
old70-80 -0.068 *** 0.005 -0.183 *** 0.023 -0.149 *** 0.014 -0.151 *** 0.016 -0.029 *** 0.006
old80 -0.025 *** 0.006 -0.08 *** 0.032 -0.036 ** 0.017 -0.121 *** 0.029 -0.01 0.008
Education
Low skilled
ISCED35 0.122 *** 0.002 0.177 *** 0.008 0.096 *** 0.004 0.091 *** 0.004 0.135 *** 0.003
ISCED67 0.214 *** 0.003 0.223 *** 0.008 0.176 *** 0.004 0.138 *** 0.005 0.266 *** 0.004
pISCED02 -0.016 *** 0.003 0.035 *** 0.011 0 0.007 0.049 *** 0.006 -0.033 *** 0.006
pISCED35 0.039 *** 0.003 0.078 *** 0.009 0.044 *** 0.005 0.067 *** 0.005 0.017 *** 0.006
pISCED67 0.018 *** 0.004 0.042 *** 0.009 0.023 *** 0.006 0.058 *** 0.005 0.014 ** 0.007
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Table 3 Female activity rate by welfare regimes (Continued)
Age
age_25-34
age_35-44 0.052 *** 0.003 0.039 *** 0.009 0.067 *** 0.005 0.074 *** 0.005 0.034 *** 0.005
age_45-54 -0.013 *** 0.003 -0.056 *** 0.011 0.018 *** 0.006 0.089 *** 0.005 -0.054 *** 0.005
age_55-64 -0.295 *** 0.004 -0.3 *** 0.012 -0.301 *** 0.007 -0.078 *** 0.007 -0.366 *** 0.005
Macro
Trend 0.012 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.003 0.019 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
Cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0 0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
UK Ref
DK 0.075 *** 0.005 Ref.
NL -0.039 *** 0.004 0.008 0.006
BE 0.018 *** 0.004 0.065 *** 0.005
FR 0.078 *** 0.004 0.128 *** 0.005
IE -0.046 *** 0.005 Ref.
IT -0.077 *** 0.004 -0.292 *** 0.005
GR -0.041 *** 0.004 -0.263 *** 0.006
ES 0.012 *** 0.004 -0.201 *** 0.006
PT 0.159 *** 0.004 Ref.
AT -0.053 *** 0.004 0.001 0.006
FI 0.072 *** 0.004 -0.002 0.004
SE 0.1 *** 0.004 0.031 *** 0.004
DE 0.005 0.004 0.058 *** 0.006
LU -0.04 *** 0.006 0.008 0.007
Observations 818168 50464 328750 129536 309418
Log likelihood -432849 -26584 -166126 -60103 -169704
pseudo - R2 0.148 0.123 0.142 0.086 0.174
Country dummies yes - yes yes yes
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Marginal effects at the mean and clustered St.Err are reported.
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4.2 Trends
We then allow the impact of the determinants of female labour behaviour to vary over
time by estimating the following model where the trend indicator is interacted with the
individual characteristics:
ytij = δXtij + γ ageti + λtrendt + σ cycletj (2)
+ω(trendt × ageti) + χ(trendt × Xtij) + ctyj + εtij
where trendt ×Xtij captures changes over time in the labour market status of women with
certain characteristics19. Such a specification can determine whether the participation
rate of women with a high level of education changed in 2007 with respect to 1994. As
before, the Equation (2) is estimated on both the whole sample and each welfare regime
separately. Table 4 reports the results.
Overall, the evidence shows that there are important differences in the trends of female
participation, depending both on personal and family characteristics and on welfare
regimes. While in the UK the positive trend is quite homogenous across women in differ-
ent age groups, the increase in participation is more significant for older age groups and
partly explained by cohort effects in Continental and Southern countries. Finally, in Social
Democratic countries the increase in participation is significantly stronger for women
in the youngest age group20. Education (own and partner’s) appears to have an increas-
ing role in stimulating female labour market involvement, with some differences across
regimes. Indeed, the share of women leaving inactivity is larger among highly educated
women in Continental and Social Democratic countries, while this trend is stronger for
women with a low to medium level of education in Southern countries.
Over time, the labour market participation increases for women with small chil-
dren. Again, such increase is not homogeneous across welfare regimes. It emerges that,
between 1994 and 2009, the negative impact of young children on female labour market
involvement declined significantly in Social Democratic countries and, to a lesser extent,
Continental and Southern countries, while no trend has been detected for the UK. This
phenomenon may be related to a larger availability of market or non- market child care
services (i.e., husband’s or relative’s help) accompanied by a shift in people’s values in all
European countries (and to a larger extent in the most traditional ones) from the tra-
ditional breadwinner arrangements in favour of a more equal gender division of roles
within the household. This change in the attitude towards working mothers could also
have been favoured by the expansion of flexible forms of employment which facilitates
the conciliation between family responsibilities and paid work.
The negative impact of informal elderly care on participation has increased over time
(with the exception of Social Democratic countries). According to our results, the pres-
ence of at least one co-living elderly person has a positive (and significant) impact
on female labour market involvement at the beginning of the sample period and then
becomes negative. This seems to be related to the changing role of elderly relatives within
the family, from providers of unpaid help within extended family models to recipients of
informal long-term care in the nuclear family (Leitner 2003; Saraceno 2010; Saraceno and
Naldini 2007).
In summary, the findings in Tables 3 and 4 show that the trade-off between unpaid
family involvement and labour market participation has evolved in the last twenty years
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Table 4 Female activity rate: trends and welfare regimes
All Liberal Continental Democratic Southern
Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err.
Marital status
Single
Incouple -0.041 ** 0.021 -0.034 0.073 -0.06 * 0.035 0.023 0.031 -0.029 0.032
Separated 0.056 *** 0.007 0.022 0.017 0.055 *** 0.017 -0.003 0.023 0.088 *** 0.009
Divorced 0.049 *** 0.004 0.036 *** 0.013 0.033 *** 0.007 -0.012 * 0.007 0.111 *** 0.008
Widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 0.016 0.013 -0.094 *** 0.01 -0.021 * 0.012 -0.09 *** 0.007
Children
No children
Children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.026 ** 0.012 -0.036 *** 0.005 -0.035 *** 0.006 -0.032 *** 0.004
Child 0.052 *** 0.016 0.047 0.067 0.133 *** 0.027 0.122 *** 0.026 0.002 0.022
child03 -0.16 *** 0.026 -0.272 *** 0.092 -0.263 *** 0.044 -0.354 *** 0.053 -0.064 * 0.034
child36 -0.133 *** 0.024 -0.209 ** 0.09 -0.201 *** 0.042 0.027 0.037 -0.11 *** 0.031
child614 -0.046 *** 0.018 -0.118 * 0.069 -0.047 0.032 0.003 0.033 -0.069 *** 0.023
trend*child -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.006 *** 0.002 -0.004 * 0.002 0.002 0.002
trend*child03 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 0 0.003
trend*child36 0.004 * 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.009 *** 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.005 * 0.002
trend*child614 -0.002 0.001 0 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002
Co-habiting Elderly
No elderly
old7080 0.063 ** 0.032 -0.174 0.179 0.051 0.078 -0.151 0.11 0.059 * 0.035
old80 -0.082 * 0.043 -0.025 0.248 -0.166 0.119 -0.007 0.155 -0.064 0.046
trend*old7080 -0.01 *** 0.003 0 0.013 -0.014 ** 0.007 0 0.007 -0.007 ** 0.003
trend*old80 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.019 0.01 0.009 -0.007 0.012 0.004 0.004
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Table 4 Female activity rate: trends and welfare regimes (Continued)
Education
Low skilled
ISCED35 0.086 *** 0.016 0.128 * 0.067 0.016 0.031 0.082 *** 0.031 0.112 *** 0.021
ISCED67 0.152 *** 0.019 0.106 0.074 0.045 0.036 0.108 *** 0.033 0.252 *** 0.025
trend*ISCED35 0.003 ** 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
trend*ISCED67 0.005 *** 0.002 0.01 * 0.006 0.011 *** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0 0.002
pISCED02 -0.056 ** 0.025 -0.009 0.099 0.019 0.045 0 0.044 -0.073 ** 0.033
pISCED35 -0.058 ** 0.024 0.065 0.076 0.001 0.039 -0.015 0.039 -0.106 *** 0.035
pISCED67 -0.064 *** 0.026 0.028 0.08 -0.059 0.042 -0.026 0.043 -0.018 0.039
trend*pISCED02 0.003 * 0.002 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
trend*pISCED35 0.008 *** 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.01 *** 0.003
trend*pISCED67 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.006 ** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.002 0.003
Age
25-34
35-44 -0.042 ** 0.021 0.101 0.077 -0.107 *** 0.039 0.093 *** 0.035 -0.039 0.027
45-54 -0.157 *** 0.023 -0.119 0.091 -0.239 *** 0.037 0.107 *** 0.038 -0.139 *** 0.029
55-64 -0.455 *** 0.02 -0.281 *** 0.094 -0.585 *** 0.025 0.005 0.04 -0.387 *** 0.029
trend*(35-44) 0.008 *** 0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.014 *** 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.006 *** 0.002
trend*(45-54) 0.012 *** 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.021 *** 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.008 *** 0.002
trend*(55-64) 0.013 *** 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.027 *** 0.003 -0.006 * 0.003 0.005 ** 0.002
Macro
Trend 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002
Cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Observations 818168 50464 328750 129536 309418
Log likelihood -432641.4 -26576.7 -165905.6 -60043.2 -169651
Pseudo - R2 0.148 0.123 0.143 0.086 0.175
Country dummies yes - yes yes yes
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Marginal effects at the mean and clustered St.Err are reported.
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and such changes exhibit important country-specific patterns. Moreover, participation
patterns differ substantially across age and education groups. In the following sections, we
further our understanding of the relevance of institutional factors in shaping the female
decisions between unpaid family responsibility and paid work.
5 Themacro policy and institutional indicators
The previous section provides evidence that trends in female labour market participa-
tion differ significantly not only across countries with different welfare regimes but also
across groups of women with different characteristics. In this section we account for such
heterogeneity, by looking at the response to policy and institutional settings in terms of
participation rates across groups of women. We study the role of labour market institu-
tions and policies in explaining the observed trends by focusing on two dimensions of
welfare regimes21: (1) the social policies in support to families involved in informal care,
both child-care and elderly care (hypothesis 1 in Section 2), and, (2) the policy and institu-
tional characteristics of the labour market in terms of the degree of flexibility and security
(hypothesis 2 in Section 2). Given the multilevel nature of our dataset (women nested in
countries), we model female labour supply in a micro-macro design using a multi-level
approach. A similar approach has been used by Ward and Dale (1992)22.
5.1 The macro indicators
We collect several variables related to the country-specific socioeconomic context that
are expected to be important in shaping the influence of housework and family related
responsibilities on female attachment to local labour markets. We distinguish six rele-
vant dimensions of cross-countries heterogeneity: the extent of employment protection
legislation, passive and active labour market policies, subsidies targeted to elderly peo-
ple, subsidies targeted to families, and the extent of parental leave. Table 5 presents a
description of these dimensions, by reporting on their construction and their specific
components.
In order to obtain uncorrelated synthetic indicators from the six macro variables,
we employ a Principal-Component Analysis (PCA) separately on the labour market
institutions-related dimensions and on the more general welfare policies-related dimen-
sions23. In keeping with common practice (Nardo et al. (2005); Nicoletti et al. (1999);
Kline (2004)), we have selected the first factor of each PCA that satisfies the following
requirements: eigenvalues larger than 1, individual contribution to the explanation of the
overall variance larger than 10%, cumulative contribution to the explanation of the overall
variance larger than 50%. Within each factor, dimensions are weighted according to the
proportion of the cross-country variance explained by the factor itself. The results of the
two PCA procedures are presented in Table 6.
The factor of the first PCA (Factor 1, henceforth called POL) is highly correlated with
parental leaves and family subsidies (with factor loadings larger than 0.8) and moderately
correlated with the extent of subsidies to the elderly (factor loading approximately equal
to 0.26). The higher the load the more relevant it is in defining the factor’s dimensional-
ity. Hence our first factor reasonably represents the generosity of national welfare regimes
to households with dependent children. The factor of the second PCA (Factor 2, hence-
forth called INST24) is defined by active and passive labour market policies (with factor
loadings larger than 0.9), while the extent of employment protection legislation exerts an
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Table 5 Description of macro policy and institutional indicators
Final variable Original variable Description Source
Institutions Employment Protection Legislation Composite indicator of employment protection which refers both to regulations concerning hiring
(e.g. rules favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts,
training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated prenotification periods and
severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes). OECD, various years
Passive Labour Market Policies Sum of national expenditures on active labour market policies (in percentage of national GDP),
including: Out-of-work income maintenance and support, Early retirement. OECD, various years
Active Labour Market Policies Sum of national expenditures on active labour market policies (in percentage of national GDP),
including: Training, Job Rotation and Job Sharing, Employment incentives, Supported employment
and rehabilitation, Direct job creation, Start-up incentives. OECD, various years
Policies Elderly Subsidies Sum of national transfers to the elderly population (per head at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs
(2000), in US dollars), weighted by the percentage of old-age population (over 70 years old) within the country.
This set of policies includes: Old age cash and in kind benefits, Residential care or Home-help services. OECD, various years
Family Subsidies Sum of national expenditures on allowances and other type of monthly transfers to the households
(per family at constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs(2000), in US dollars). We consider a weighted
sum of monthly family allowances for the first, second, and third child in national currency, with weights
equal to the average number of children a woman would have if she lived to the end of her childbearing
years (conventionally considered to be 15-44 but sometimes 15-49) and bore children at the prevailing
rate for each age during that period. Value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-two-parent two-child
families are considered. The value was calculated by subtracting the disposable income (after taxes and
transfers) of a one-earner-two-parent-two-child family from that of a comparable childless single earner. Gauthier (2011a)
Paternal Leave Composite indicator of national expenditures on maternity, parental, and child care leave schemes. It is a
weighted sum of the total number of weeks of maternity, parental and child-care leave, with weights equal
to the cash benefits paid during the leave as a percent of female wages in manufacturing. Gauthier (2011b)
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Table 6 Principal component analysis: rotated factor loadings
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
Elderly Subsidies 0.257 0.9339
Parental Leave 0.8251 0.3192
Family Subsidies 0.8399 0.2946
Employment Protection Legislation -0.1499 0.9775
Passive Labour Market Policies 0.9119 0.1684
Active Labour Market Policies 0.9215 0.1509
inverse impact on it (with negative factor loading, -0.15). Hence, this factor resumes the
degree of flexicurity of national labour market institutions25.
5.2 The role of policies and institutions
Our econometric specification consists of a multi-level analysis based on our baseline
probit model (1). We allow both the intercept and the impacts of some individual char-
acteristics (namely, having small children and co-living with an old-aged dependent) to
depend on the two country- specific (but time variant) macroeconomic factors defined
above: INST (labour market institutional context) and POL (family oriented policies).
Our random coefficient model is composed by a first-level regression at the individual
level specified as follows:
ytij = βt0j + βt11jCHILDtij + βt12jELDERLY tij + β2′xt2ij + εtij (3)
and a second level set of regressions as follows:
βt0j = δ0 + δ1INSTtj + δ2POLtj + νtj
βt11j = γ10 + γ11INSTtj + γ12POLtj + υt1j
βt12j = γ20 + γ21INSTtj + γ22POLtj + υt2j
where x2 is a set of additional controls which capture the impact of other micro-
characteristics on the likelihood of female participation.
We implement Generalized Linear Latent Models to estimate a two-level Random-
Intercept Probit model and a two-level Random-Coefficient Probit model, taking into
account the nesting of individuals in their country of origin26. Unlike in the analysis per-
formed in Section 4, we now focus on women in prime-age group (25-54) because family
care burdens, such as child care and elderly care, are less relevant to those in the elder
group (55-64)27. The model is estimated for the whole sample (pooled model) and then
for each age group separately. We also test whether and to what extent changes in family
policies and labour market institutions affect differently the labour market decisions of
women with different levels of education and estimate model (3) for the three education
groups (primary, secondary and tertiary education)28.
The results are reported in Table 7 for the whole sample and in Table 8 for the three age
groups (Panel A) and the three education groups (Panel B)29.
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Table 7 Two-level probit regression: the impact policy & institutions - whole sample
All
Coef. St.Err.
INST -0.006 0.014
POL 0.003 0.024
INST × child06 0.015 *** 0.001
POL × child06 0 0.001
INST × old70 -0.02 *** 0.003
POL × old70 -0.008 ** 0.003
VPC_overall 0.056
VPC_level 2 0.426
Both the POL and INST indicators exert are significantly related to female likelihood
of being active, though their effect is mediated by the type of unpaid work involvement
(presence of child and/or elder person) and differs substantially across age and education
groups.
Regarding the role of family policies (POL), the availability of childcare subsidies and
child-friendly policies is positively related to the activity rate of women with children
and the effect is significant for young women (25-34) at the early stage of their work
life and, quite surprisingly, for medium and high educated women. Indeed the estimated
coefficient is not significant for low-skilled women, whose employment opportunities are
limited both in terms of job quality and wages30.
Conversely, policy measures to help women combine caring and job responsibilities
have varying effects on the willingness to work of women co-living with an elderly person.
The coefficient is in general negative and significant for older (age group 44-55) and low
educated women. These results show that the effect of policies on female choice between
paid work and unpaid care crucially depends on their outside family options and labour
market potential outcomes. In general, cash benefits increase household income and the
reservation wage at which women are available to work. Therefore, more generous sup-
ports for child-related and elder-related costs are more likely to discourage the labour
market participation of low-skilled women in charge of family care, since their labour
market options (in terms of wage and type of jobs) are poorer.
Turning to the effects of the institutions indicator (INST), more flexibility and/or more
security is employment-enhancing for young women (25-34) with small children regard-
less the level of education. These results imply that the availability of flexicure jobs favours
the labour market participation of women with children - especially those women at the
beginning of their working career -, by reducing the labour market entry costs. Women
with elderly care responsibility respond differently to changes in the labour market insti-
tutional framework. Higher labour flexibility seems to be detrimental for the labour
market involvement of women co-living with an elderly person. This is apparently in con-
trast with the existing empirical evidence which shows that less educated women (with
a lower attachment to work) are more responsive to work incentives created by pol-
icy/institutional changes. The result may be related to the fact that only a few countries
in Europe have combined the two dimensions of flexibility and security31, and, in most
cases, deregulation is moving forward without sufficient social compensation. In this
respect, the growing availability of flexible (low-paid) jobs, which very often represent
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Table 8 Two-level probit regression: the impact policy & institutions by age (Panel A) and education (Panel B)
Panel A Panel B
25-34 35-44 45-54 ISCED 0-2 ISCED 3-5 ISCED 6-7
Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err.
INST -0.031 0.037 0.008 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.004 0.028 -0.012 0.013 -0.015 *** 0.014
POL -0.009 0.045 0.013 0.026 0.006 0.02 -0.021 0.041 -0.001 0.024 -0.01 0.02
INST × child06 0.04 *** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.012 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.002
POL × child06 0.006 *** 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.004 ** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002
INST × old70 -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.019 *** 0.005 -0.023 *** 0.005 -0.041 *** 0.006 -0.02 *** 0.006 -0.001 0.006
POL × old70 -0.008 0.007 0.004 0.006 -0.026 *** 0.005 -0.02 *** 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.006
VPC_overall 0.199 0.063 0.042 0.121 0.048 0.058
VPC_level 2 0.675 0.439 0.439 0.572 0.419 0.453
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Marginal effects at the mean and clustered St.Err are reported.
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a forced alternative rather than an option for more stable forms of employment, makes
unpaid elderly caring more attractive than paid occupations, especially in countries where
family caring activities are supported by monetary allowances that can be freely used to
complement the family budget32. This is confirmed by the fact that the negative role of
flexibility on the labour market inclusion of women with elder-care responsibilities holds
especially for low to medium-educated women whose work opportunities are in general
poorer.
To summarize, female labour market behaviour is significantly associated with the
institutional characteristics of the labour market and the social policy environment,
though this link is mediated by individual characteristics. In particular, social poli-
cies aimed at women involved in family care have a strong and significant role on the
labour market participation of young mothers with a medium to high level of educa-
tion. The effect is nevertheless negative when older and low skilled women are involved
in elderly care. Conversely, more flexicure institutions significantly enhance the par-
ticipation of mothers at early stage of their working career who benefit more of a
larger availability of flexible forms of employment and a reduction of the labour mar-
ket entry costs. The same result does not hold for low-skilled women with elder-care
responsibilities.
Our results indicate that social policies and labour market institutional characteris-
tics explain a non-negligible percentage of the female labour market participation across
European countries. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) for the overall model
(Table 7) is approximately equal to 0.06, which indicates that 6% of the observed variabil-
ity in the participation rates can be attributed to country-level factors. This coefficient
increases when the model is separately estimated by age-group and educational level
(Table 8). In particular, macroeconomic heterogeneity is particularly relevant in explain-
ing cross-country differences in the participation rates of younger and less skilled women
(VPC increases up to 20% and 11% respectively), while more than 95% of the observed
variability in the labour market participation of women between 45 and 55 years old is
due to individual characteristics. The macro factors INST and POL explain up to 67%
of the overall cross-countries variance, as shown by the level-2 variance partition coeffi-
cients. Thus the remaining 33% is due to unobserved country-level characteristics, such
as changes in cultural attitude towards female labour market involvement, as well as other
country-specific time-variant factors which have not been explicitly considered in the
model.
5.3 The role of flexicurity
In the last set of regressions we focus more specifically on the impact of flexicurity on
women labour market involvement by disentangling the impact of the two components of
the indicator INST - flexibility (FLEX) and security (SEC) and their interaction (FLEX ×
SEC)33.
The results for the pooled sample are reported in Table 9; those for the three age
groups and for the different levels of education are reported in Table 10, Panel A and B
respectively.
Table 9 shows that a higher degree of labour flexibility has a positive effect on the
activity rate only if it is accompanied by policies which are aimed at guaranteeing
access to employment security in terms of both active labour market policies and the
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Table 9 Two-level probit regression flexicurity: the impact of flexicurity - whole sample
All
Coef. St.Err.
FLEX -0.248 ** 0.118
SEC -0.209 * 0.116
FLEX x SEC 0.118 * 0.061
FLEX x child06 -0.057 *** 0.003
SEC x child06 -0.022 *** 0.004
FLEX x SEC x child06 0.025 *** 0.002
FLEX x old70 -0.022 *** 0.005
SEC x old70 -0.031 *** 0.008
FLEX x SEC x old70 0.006 0.005
VPC_overall 0.224
VPC_level 2 0.264
inclusiveness of unemployment benefits. At the same time, a larger degree of security
is beneficial to female involvement only in sufficiently flexible labour markets, which
provide an easier access to employment. The impacts of flexibility, security and their
interactions are significant and qualitatively the same across age groups with the excep-
tion of those in the oldest age group (44-54 in our sample). The interaction between
flexibility and security is stronger for young women at the early stage of their work-
ing career and, consistently with the results found in the previous set of regressions,
for those women with family care responsibilities. These results suggest that combin-
ing a high degree of labour market flexibility with a high level of social protection
leads to significant gains in terms of female labour market participation, while omit-
ting one of the two aspects can produce sub-optimal (or even negative) outcomes
in terms of labour market performance. The marginal effect of flexibility on female
activity rate becomes positive in correspondence to a value of the security indicator
above 2.00, the level of security of countries such as Sweden and France in our sam-
ple34. On the other hand, the marginal effect of security becomes positive for value of
the flexibility indicator above 1.76, the amount of flexibility in Germany, Finland and
Netherlands35.
In Figure 5 we can observe that in the period 2004-2009, the countries for which
both the flexibility and security indicators are above the estimated thresholds are the
Social Democratic countries (though Sweden only marginally), Netherlands and at
the margin Belgium, and Germany36. After the institutional reforms implemented in
the late 1990s and early 2000s to promote a more flexible labour market, Italy appears
still deficient on the security side. The opposite holds for France and Spain which are still
characterized by a rigid labour market. Greece and Portugal remain well below both the
thresholds.
The picture that emerges from this last exercise can be summarized by saying that in the
Social Democratic and some Central European countries, institutional changes towards
the flexicurity model are correlated with positive trends in female labour market partici-
pation and this is particular true for young women with kids. On the contrary, in southern
European countries and the UK, the adopted mix of security and flexibility is not enough
to stimulate female involvement in the labour market.
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Table 10 Two-level probit regression flexicurity: the impact of flexicurity by age (Panel A) and education (Panel B)
Panel A Panel B
25-34 35-44 45-54 ISCED 0-2 ISCED 3-5 ISCED 6-7
Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err. Coef. St.Err.
FLEX -0.197 0.139 -0.131 0.094 -0.057 0.072 -0.136 0.149 -0.002 0.064 -0.014 0.046
SEC -0.168 * 0.098 -0.132 0.097 -0.044 0.07 -0.242 * 0.149 0.022 0.063 -0.007 0.049
FLEX x SEC 0.095 * 0.05 0.084 * 0.044 0.029 0.033 0.133 *** 0.054 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.025
FLEX x child06 -0.056 *** 0.004 -0.069 *** 0.004 -0.044 *** 0.011 -0.067 *** 0.005 -0.084 *** 0.005 -0.052 *** 0.004
SEC x child06 0.021 *** 0.006 -0.067 *** 0.007 -0.022 0.019 -0.01 0.008 -0.048 *** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.006
FLEX x SEC x child06 0.019 *** 0.003 0.038 *** 0.003 0.016 * 0.009 0.019 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.003 0.006 * 0.003
FLEX x old70 -0.027 ** 0.011 -0.033 *** 0.009 -0.01 0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.048 *** 0.01 -0.013 0.009
SEC x old70 -0.042 *** 0.016 -0.036 *** 0.013 -0.017 0.012 -0.013 0.013 -0.078 *** 0.014 -0.009 0.014
FLEX x SEC x old70 0.022 ** 0.01 0.01 0.008 -0.007 0.007 0.017 ** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.008 0.005 0.009
VPC_overall 0.257 0.308 0.333 0.365 0.211 0.211
VPC_level 2 0.287 0.385 0.589 0.418 0.322 0.323
Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Marginal effects at the mean and clustered St.Err are reported.
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Figure 5 The flexicurity dimensions. Source: Own elaborations from OECD institutions and SOCX databases.
5.4 Quantifying the influence of institutions and social policies
We now provide a more precise quantification of the effects of labour market flexibility
and security and of those of social policies in support to families on women’ activity rate.
Following the growth accounting methodology proposed by Stoker (1985), it is possible
to show that, under plausible restrictions, a first-order difference of our multilevel model
provides an Oaxaca-fashion decomposition of changes in female activity rates. Such a
decomposition enables us to assess how much of the observed growth in female labour
force participation is due to changes in the macro factors (INST and POL), as opposed
to changes from other sources (such as changes in the individual characteristics). More
specifically, the variation of the female activity rate between two periods is composed
of five different elements. The first term describes how much of the change in women
participation rate comes exclusively from changes in individual characteristics. The sec-
ond term quantifies how much of that change is due to the interplay between individual
characteristics and country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The third term captures
the effects arising from the interaction between changes in individual characteristics and
observed macro factors, whereas the fourth component captures the influence of changes
in the macro factors INST and POL. The fifth term is a residual component. The technical
details of this decomposition are reported in Appendix B.
Table 11 collects the estimation results which are obtained using the decomposition
for the whole sample, whereas Table 12 shows the evidence for the four welfare regimes
separately.
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Table 11 INST and POL contribution to female participation
EU15
 Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL
rate INST and POL other observables contribution (%)
1995 0.0053 0.0009 0.0007 0.17
1996 0.0165 0.0005 0.0087 0.03
1997 0.0234 0.0011 0.0183 0.047
1998 0.0318 0.0025 0.0123 0.079
1999 0.0439 0.0027 0.013 0.062
2000 0.0515 0.0037 0.0097 0.072
2004 0.0813 0.0021 0.0558 0.026
2005 0.0888 0.0046 0.0605 0.052
2006 0.097 0.0055 0.0626 0.057
2007 0.1023 0.007 0.064 0.068
2008 0.1073 0.0075 0.0614 0.07
2009 0.113 0.0026 0.0557 0.023
Mean 0.063
On average, 6.2% of the overall increase in female participation between 1994 and 2009
is associated with changes in the institution and policy indicators. Only a small part of
the actual rise over time in the employment rate is associated with changes in the institu-
tions and policies indicators in Southern countries (around 3%), while the contribution is
remarkable higher in the Social Democratic countries. For these countries, the INST and
POL indicators predict more than 14% of the observed change in the female participation.
This last result aligns with the findings discussed in the previous session, which show that
in the Social Democratic regime, institutional changes towards the flexicurity model are
highly correlated with positive trends in female labour market participation.
Table 13 and Table 14 present the estimation results for the three age and the three
education groups respectively.
These results indicate that the contribution of changes of institutions and policies to the
growth of female participation is considerably higher for young (24.6%) and high skilled
women (38.6%). In line with the previous literature, these findings confirm that the social
welfare changes and the labour market regulatory reforms in Europe contribute to explain
the observed trends in the activity rate of women who face higher labour market entry
costs, such as young women who are at the beginning of their working career and more
involved in child care duties. Interestingly, the mix of labour market reforms and policies
changes which have been implemented in Europe in the last 20 years fail to explain the
observed pattern of the activity rate of low-educated women.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides detailed macro-level evidence on female labour market participation
trends in the last 20 years for a large set of EU countries using micro data from the ECHP
and EU-SILC surveys. Three main results emerge from our analysis.
First, we show that the observed trends in the labour market participation of women
have not been uniform across countries in different welfare regimes and, within countries,
across women with different individual and family characteristics. For example, accord-
ing to our results, the labour market involvement of women with young children has
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Table 12 INST and POL contribution to female participation by welfare regime
 Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL  Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL
rate INST and POL other observables contribution (%) rate INST and POL other observables contribution (%)
Continental Social democratic
1995 0.0059 0.0008 -0.0036 0.136 -0.001 0.0007 -0.0064 -0.7
1996 0.0186 0.0001 -0.0029 0.005 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0198 0.2
1997 0.0307 0.0007 -0.0011 0.023 -0.0083 0.0014 -0.0192 -0.169
1998 0.0407 0.0032 -0.025 0.079 -0.0067 0.0021 -0.0184 -0.313
1999 0.0566 0.004 -0.0263 0.071 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0175 -0.271
2000 0.0651 0.0051 -0.031 0.078 -0.0003 0.00017 -0.015 -0.567
2004 0.0996 -0.0003 0.0279 -0.003 0.0003 0.00023 0.0016 0.767
2005 0.109 0.0058 0.0429 0.053 0.0053 0.0045 0.0002 0.849
2006 0.1181 0.0064 0.0439 0.054 0.0083 0.0053 0.0009 0.639
2007 0.126 0.0074 0.0454 0.059 0.0117 0.0075 -0.0008 0.641
2008 0.1281 0.0098 0.0413 0.077 0.018 0.0079 -0.0046 0.439
2009 0.1357 0.0027 0.0319 0.02 0.016 0.0031 -0.0091 0.194
Mean 0.054 0.142
Liberal Southern
1995 0.002 -0.0002 0.0017 -0.1 0.0097 0.0009 0.0031 0.093
1996 0.007 0.0002 0.0038 0.029 0.0283 0.0014 0.004 0.049
1997 0.011 0.0003 0.0059 0.027 0.0375 0.002 0.0057 0.053
1998 0.013 0.0006 0.0534 0.046 0.0498 0.0025 0.0082 0.05
1999 0.021 0.0009 0.0585 0.043 0.0607 0.0019 0.01 0.031
2000 0.023 0.0022 0.0395 0.096 0.0735 0.0018 0.0125 0.024
2004 0.1235 0.0013 0.0499 0.011
2005 0.034 0.004 0.0739 0.118 0.1298 0.002 0.0514 0.015
2006 0.037 0.0038 0.0708 0.103 0.1415 0.0032 0.0547 0.023
2007 0.037 0.004 0.0774 0.108 0.145 0.0049 0.0563 0.034
2008 0.043 0.0035 0.0764 0.081 0.1537 0.0038 0.0552 0.025
2009 0.1622 -0.0006 0.0562 -0.004
Mean 0.055 0.034
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Table 13 INST and POL contribution to female participation by age groups
25-34 35-44 45-54
 Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL  Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL  Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL
rate INST and other contribution (%) rate INST and other contribution (%) rate INST and other contribution (%)
POL observables POL observables POL observables
1995 0.016 0.0073 -0.0028 0.456 0.0346 0.0003 -0.003 0.009 0.0556 -0.0031 0.0089 -0.056
1996 0.029 0.0032 -0.0022 0.11 0.0473 0.0013 0.0026 0.027 0.0609 0.0012 0.0276 0.02
1997 0.0342 0.0043 -0.0074 0.126 0.0549 0.0022 0.0098 0.04 0.0728 0.0024 0.0535 0.033
1998 0.038 0.0088 -0.0172 0.232 0.058 0.0045 0.0003 0.078 0.0876 0.0007 0.0536 0.008
1999 0.0509 0.0108 -0.0209 0.212 0.0713 0.0048 -0.0021 0.067 0.1049 0.0004 0.0629 0.004
2000 0.0598 0.0191 -0.0331 0.319 0.0796 0.0045 -0.0063 0.057 0.1121 -0.004 0.0675 -0.036
2004 0.0741 0.0159 0.0314 0.215 0.1044 0.0006 0.0523 0.006 0.1614 -0.0031 0.1078 -0.019
2005 0.0769 0.0195 0.0019 0.254 0.111 0.0068 0.0509 0.061 0.1772 -0.0015 0.1415 -0.008
2006 0.0842 0.0229 -0.0041 0.272 0.1194 0.0077 0.0518 0.064 0.1871 -0.0033 0.1536 -0.018
2007 0.0856 0.0289 -0.0098 0.338 0.1257 0.0094 0.0523 0.075 0.1962 -0.006 0.1638 -0.031
2008 0.0887 0.0291 -0.0176 0.328 0.1285 0.0104 0.0493 0.081 0.2061 -0.0057 0.1657 -0.028
2009 0.0949 0.0087 -0.0207 0.092 0.1359 0.0038 0.0423 0.028 0.2107 0.0005 0.1598 0.002
Mean 0.246 0.049 -0.011
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Table 14 INST and POL contribution to female participation by education groups
ISCED 0-2 ISCED 3-5 ISCED 6-7
 Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL  Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL  Activity Predicted by Predicted by INST and POL
rate INST and other contribution (%) rate INST and other contribution (%) rate INST and other contribution (%)
POL observables POL observables POL observables
1995 0.0485 -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.035 0.0163 0.0023 -0.0001 0.141 0.0117 0.0054 -0.0038 0.462
1996 0.0401 -0.0021 0.0034 -0.052 0.0301 0.0005 0.0055 0.017 0.0163 -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.172
1997 0.0467 -0.0034 0.0106 -0.073 0.0297 0.0005 0.0165 0.017 0.0191 -0.0015 0.0021 -0.079
1998 0.0694 -0.0131 0.0046 -0.189 0.0513 0.0034 0.0152 0.066 0.0339 0.0104 -0.0164 0.307
1999 0.0608 -0.0115 0.0044 -0.189 0.0491 0.0035 0.0154 0.071 0.0301 0.0119 -0.0199 0.395
2000 0.0677 -0.0143 0.0034 -0.211 0.0574 0.0067 0.0154 0.117 0.0293 0.02 -0.0226 0.683
2004 0.0825 -0.0061 0.0435 -0.074 0.0656 0.0063 0.0383 0.096 0.0336 0.0157 -0.0012 0.467
2005 0.0866 -0.0115 0.0387 -0.133 0.0697 0.0061 0.0254 0.088 0.0361 0.0177 -0.0169 0.49
2006 0.0923 -0.0132 0.04 -0.143 0.0791 0.0071 0.0276 0.09 0.0388 0.0207 -0.0173 0.534
2007 0.1008 -0.0168 0.0402 -0.167 0.0831 0.0093 0.0254 0.112 0.0405 0.0254 -0.0161 0.627
2008 0.1017 -0.0164 0.0388 -0.161 0.0873 0.0094 0.0198 0.108 0.0409 0.0257 -0.0241 0.628
2009 0.0998 -0.0066 0.0345 -0.066 0.0913 0.0062 0.0095 0.068 0.044 0.0132 -0.0323 0.3
Mean -0.124 0.082 0.387
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increased over time, while informal elder-care has increasingly reduced female chance to
work.
Second, we find that the estimated trends in female labour market participation are
related to differences in the labour market institutional setting and in the social policy
environment across countries. Such policy and institutional factors play an important role
in shaping the labour market opportunities of women by affecting the quality of potential
jobs available, the chances to (re-)enter the labour market, and the opportunity costs of
employment (vs non-employment). As expected, the estimated effects vary across women
with different characteristics, such as type of family care involvement, age and level of
education. In particular, the observed positive trend in the attitude to work of womenwith
children appears to be favoured by the expansion of flexible forms of employment which
have progressively eased labourmarket access by reducing entry costs. This positive effect
is stronger for women at the early stage of their work life despite the level of education.
Generous child and family benefits and maternity/paternity leaves are positively related
to women labour market attachment of young mothers, and the effect is stronger for
medium to high-educated individuals.
Third, our analysis reveals a positive association between female activity rate and
changes of the institutional framework towards the flexicurity model in countries such as
Denmark and Netherlands which are characterized by a balanced mix of flexibility and
security. The policy implications of this last set of results are clear: reforms of employment
protection towards a larger degree of flexibility need to be accompanied by an increase
in state-provided security. Such a mix of institutional reforms will guarantee, on the one
hand, lower entry costs for individuals with a weaker attachment to work and, on the
other, a set of incentives to actively participate to the labour market.
Finally, we provide a quantification of howmuch of the observed trend in female labour
market participation can be attributed to changes in the labour market institutional set-
ting and family policies through a simple decomposition exercise. We find that the mix
of institutional and policy changes accounts for almost 25% of the increase of the labour
market participation of young women (around 2.5% points) and 38% of the participation
of high educated women (around 1.5% points). Our results also reveal that the changing
institutional and policy setting accounts for a lower fraction of the increase in the labour
market participation of low-skilled women in Europe.
Endnotes
1 In 1997, the Member States of the European Union (EU) unanimously decided to add
a new article to the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 13). The new article enabled the Council
to take appropriate actions to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
2This information is retrieved from the OECD labour market statistics, http://stats.
oecd.org/.
3Algan and Cahuc (2007); Fernandez (2007); Fortin (2005); Giavazzi et al. (2009);
Olivetti et al. (2013).
4Goodpaster (2010); Leigh (2010); Munasinghe et al. (2008).
5Ermisch (2003); Euwals et al. (2011); Goldin (2006); Gustafsson and Kenjoh (2008).
6Beaudry and Lemieux (1999); Fitzenberger et al. (2004); Balleer et al. (2009).
7Employment in Europe 2001 reports that drop-out rates from employment into
unemployment or inactivity are strongly linked to job quality. High levels of involuntary
temporary contracts and part-time work are associated with high drop out rates (some
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15% into unemployment and 10% into inactivity). Del Boca et al. (2009) show that the
influence of part-time on participation is positive only where part-time jobs are
perceived to be of ‘high quality’.
8With regard to the effect of the presence of an elderly relative on women labour
supply, the existing studies have not determined a clear relationship. Wolf and Soldo
(1994), estimating simultaneously the choice of employment and elderly care cannot
find any negative relationship. Ettner (1995) for the US, Heitmueller and Michaud (2006)
for the UK and Casado et al. (2007) for Spain show that co-residing with a disabled
senior person has a relevant discouraging effect on participation in the labour market.
Chang and White-Means (1995) find that co-residing with the senior person has a
negative effect on female participation and that such effect is particularly strong for
low-educated women.
9ECHP data were first collected in 1994, when a sample of 60,500 nationally
representative households (i.e. approximately 130,000 adults aged over 16) were
interviewed in 12 member states. Austria joined the project in the second wave in 1995,
Finland in 1996, and Sweden in 1997. Therefore, since then, the data is covering all
EU-15 member states.
10 In the 2004 wave, EU-SILC covered all EU-15 member states except Germany,
Netherlands and the UK. Since 2005, the dataset involves the 25 EU member states, plus
Norway and Iceland.
11Namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
12Technical details can be found in Appendix A.
13For each European country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP data) and
between 2004-2009 (EU-SILC data) we compute the two different indicators and perform
t-test statistics to assess significant difference between the beginning and the end of the
observed time window. The complete list of results is collected in Additional file 1
Tables S1–S2. For robustness check, we have also performed a t-test for differences bet-
ween means of the first period (1994-2000 covered by the ECHP survey) and the second
period (2004-2009 covered by the EUSILC survey). The results remain qualitatively
the same; indeed, when differences appear to be significant using the initial and final
year of the sample, they are significant also when using a comparison between means.
14 In some respect, the presence of an elderly relative in the household can be a better
proxy of care burdens than having children. This variable is indeed less affected by
endogeneity issues that may arise in the estimation as a consequence of the possible
inverse causal relationship between labour market status and the rational choice of
having a child (Cipollone and D’Ippoliti 2011).
15Not surprisingly, the results for the employment rate are qualitatively the same as
those reported for the participation rate, with some differences in the magnitude of the
impacts. While activity rates are widely used as an indicator of labour market
involvement, it is increasingly recognized that employment and hours worked are the
key indicators for assessing female labour market integration (Jonung and Persson
1993). One reason is that female unemployment is often hidden among those defined as
inactive because of the low work attachment of women of specific groups (typically low
skilled women with young children). Results are available upon request.
16Regressions of models (1) and (2) have been run also for the restricted sample of
women between 25 and 54 years old. The results remain qualitatively unchanged with
respect to those in Tables 3 and 4.
17Note that the reported coefficients should not be interpreted as causal effects, as
both participation and fertility may be simultaneous decisions. The direction of the bias
is difficult to detect.
18This may be due to a number of factors, such as differences in the composition of the
labour force and in the institutional setting. In countries where female labour force
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participation is low, women in employment are typically characterized by a higher level
of education, implying a stronger labour market attachment. Moreover, labour market
institutional rigidities in Southern countries - which make (re)entering the labour
market after a period of temporary leave more difficult- may stimulate higher continuity
in work attachment. This difficulty in re-entering the market seems to be confirmed by
evidence that in the Social Democratic countries (and to a less extent in the Continental
countries) mothers’ participation and employment increase steadily as the youngest
child grows up (mostly through a re-entry to part time employment). In Southern
countries, the presence of children negatively affects female labour market participation,
even when the child is of school age.
19We use a simple linear trend since any different choice would increase the
complexity of the model. For example, the use of year dummies in Equation 2 implies to
create almost 20 additional interaction term for each individual/family characteristic, for
a total of around 240 additional estimated coefficients. Nevertheless, the trend of the
aggregate participation rate estimated using year dummies is qualitatively consistent
with the one obtained imposing the more parsimonious linear functional form.
20 In fact, while there is not a substantial difference in the labour market behaviour of
women in their mid 20s and 30s (born after the early 1960s and grew up and educated
after the feminist movement in the 1970s), for those in their mid 30s and 40s, the
participation rate has increased by 11%, and for those older than 45 by almost 20%.
21A similar characterization of the welfare regimes has been followed by Bertola et al.
(2001).
22The multilevel method allows the researcher to state what portion of a dependent
variable’s variance is attributable to state-level versus individual-level variation
generated by both observable and unobservable factors. The option of using clustered
robust standard errors on standard regressions with interactions to account for the
intraclass correlation is a “weaker” form of correction than using a multilevel model.
The multilevel model not only accounts for the intraclass correlation, but also corrects
the denominator degrees of freedom for the number of clusters. Therefore, the
advantage in using multilevel analysis techniques lies in inferential issues by providing
more accurate standard errors. Technical details and inferential issues related to the
application of the multilevel analysis techniques can be found in Hox (2010).
23Principal-Component Analysis (PCA) aims to convert a set of possibly correlated
variables into a lower dimensional set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal
components. These relevant factors are then rotated using the varimax method to
maximize the procedure’s efficiency (Kline (2004)).
24The macro factor INST captures (1) the extent of Active and Passive Labour Market
Programs (LMPs) and (2) the extent of employment protection legislation (EPL).
Though LMPs can be more properly referred to as labour market policies, in the macro
literature, LMPs are often considered as labour market “institutional factors” (see among
the others Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Gomez-Salvador et al. 2004; Nickell et al. 2005;
Boeri et al. 2012). Hence, for the sake of brevity, we denominate the overall macro factor
which encompasses both aspects of the labour market as INST .
25The similarity between the standard definition of flexicurity and our second factor is
straightforward. Indeed, the European Commission defines flexicurity as an integrated
strategy to simultaneously enhance flexibility and security in the labour market. It is
traditionally implemented by means of: 1) flexible and reliable contractual
arrangements, which are negatively correlated with employment protection; 2) effective
active labour market policies; and 3) modern social security systems providing adequate
income support during employment transitions, which are positively correlated with
passive labour market policies.
26Cipollone and D’Ippoliti (2011) carried out a similar analysis for Italy, exploiting
territorial heterogeneity at regional level.
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27 In particular, for women in the age group (55-64), the “variable co-living with an
elderly relative (older than 70)” can simply capture the presence of the partner rather
than the presence of a relative in need of care. The coefficients for the specifications in
Tables 3 and 4, over the restricted sample of women between 25 and 55 years old
(Table 3B and Table 4B) are qualitatively similar to those of the whole sample. Results
are available upon request.
28We also explore the possibility of an interaction between welfare policies (POL) and
labour market institutions (INST). Policies aimed to support income may be related to a
decrease in participation by increasing the reservation wage. At the same time, income
support may reduce the potential impact of reforms of the labour market institutional
framework aimed to increase participation. However, our family policy indicator (POL)
is too broad to capture clearly the underlying mechanism of action, and the estimated
effect of its interaction with the INST indicator would be difficult to interpret. Results
are available upon request.
29The estimated coefficients on individual controls are consistent with those reported
in the previous sessions and and are available from the authors upon request.
30Such results may be related to the fact that the indicator POL includes both in-kind
(maternity and paternity leaves, child care facilities ecc.) and monetary (family
allowances) transfers. While the former have a positive impact on mothers labour
market attachment, the latter may have a negative impact which is stronger for
low-income mothers (Del Boca et al. 2009).
31Combining the two axes of flexibility and security, Tangian (2007) concludes that
only Denmark and Netherlands are developing both dimensions.
32See Simonazzi (2009) for a detailed analysis of the recent dynamics of the care sector
in the EU countries.
33The interplay between flexibility and security in determining labour market
performance have been at the forefront of the EU social policy and economic debate in
the last decade (European Commission 2012; OECD 2004; OECD 2010). While the
labour market effects of the interaction between security and flexibility have been
extensively studied from a theoretical point of view (see, for example, Blanchard and
Tirole 2008; Boeri et al., 2003), the empirical evidence is still scarce.
34This threshold is slightly higher for women with young children (2.05) and lower for
women involved in elderly care (1.92).
35The flexibility threshold becomes 1.60 and 1.92 for women involved in child care
and elderly care respectively.
36Notice that the Social Democratic countries (and to less extent the Continental
countries) are also those countries for which we estimated the strongest (negative) trend
in the effect of young children on female participation (see Table 4).
37The Vidgor index (Vidgor, 2008) is derived for a value of p = 0.5 and does not explic-
itly deal with differences between x and z variables.
38Algan et al. (2012) use this analysis to study cultural and economic integration pat-
terns of immigrants in Europe.
39Through this simplification, we neglect variations on the coefficient estimates due to
changes in preferences which are not related to macro-factors. Since our aim is to quan-
tify the role of changes in macro-factors on female decisions, this simplification does not
affect our results.
A Appendix 1
A.1 Vigdor index: methodological framework
Let us define D to be a binary variable taking the value “0” if the individual is in group 0
and “1” if he/she is in group 1. We are interested in assessing differences between group
0 and group 1 using a one-dimensional measure of how different are the distributions of
some characteristics x between group 0 and 1.
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Let us denote by fo(x) the density function of x among group 0 individuals (reference
group), and by f1(x) the density function of x among group 1 individuals.
Vigdor (2008) estimates a model for
P(D = 1|x) = pf1(x)pf1(x) + (1 − p)f0(x) =
pf1(x)
f (x) = ρ(x), (4)
where p is the proportion of group 1 individuals in the population and f (x) is the density
function of x in the population. A generalization of the Vidgor index which is between 0
and 1 and is composition invariant (i.e. it does not depend on p) is
I = 2
∫ f0(x)f1(x)
f0(x) + f1(x)dx = 2
∫ 1
1 + g(x) f1(x)dx.
Such an analysis is based on the ratio g(x) = f1(x)f0(x) which will be equal to 1 if group 0 and
1 have the same distribution of x. This implies that any difference in the observed x will
result in a discrepancy between group 0 and 1 in the synthetic index.
An important empirical issue is that there might be some characteristics z whose dif-
ferences between group 0 and 1 are not appropriate to take into consideration and infer a
behavioural difference between group 0 and 1. For example, we do not want to label differ-
ences in the age structures between two groups as differences in labour market behaviour
between the two groups. The unconditional distribution of x (as in (4)) will be different
if individuals in group 0 and 1 have a different distribution of z. An analysis based on (4)
would be misleading. For example, if group 0 and group 1 are women and men, we do
not want to capture differences in labour market performance between women and men
due to different gender population structure. Gender demographic trends are correlated
to differences in employment, labour market participation or job types, but they are not
a matter of research themselves. Therefore, we need to work with the distribution of x
given z.
Denote by fo(x|z) the density function of x given z among group 0 individuals, f1(x|z) the
density function of x given z among group 1 individuals. Define the marginal distributions
of z among group 0 and 1, ho(z) and h1(z) respectively. We are thus interested in the ratio
between density functions
g(x|z) = f1(x|z)f0(x|z) =
f1(x, z)
f0(x, z)
ho(z)
h1(z)
. (5)
A generalization of the Vidgor index which allows for the presence of z variables, while
remaining composition invariant, is37
I = 2
∫ 1
1 + g(x|z) f1(x|z)h1(z)dxdz (6)
Empirically, one has to get an estimate of g(x|z). One way to proceed is as follows.
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First, estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 on x and z
P(D = 1|x, z) = pf1(x, z)pf1(x, z) + (1 − p)f0(x, z) =
pf1(x, z)
f (x, z) = ρ(x, z). (7)
We can write
f1(x, z)
f0(x, z)
= ρ(x, z)[1 − ρ(x, z)]
(1 − p)
p .
Substituting into (5), we have that
g(x|z) = ρ(x, z)[1 − ρ(x, z)]
(1 − p)
p
ho(z)
h1(z)
. (8)
Second, estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 conditional on z
alone
P(D = 1|z) = ph1(z)ph1(z) + (1 − p)h0(z) = ϕ(z). (9)
We can write
ho(z)
h1(z)
= ϕ(z)[1 − ϕ(z)]
(1 − p)
p .
Substituting into (8) we have that
g(x|z) = ρ(x, z)[1 − ρ(x, z)]
[1 − ϕ(z)]
ϕ(z) .
In short, the relative densities of x conditional on z can be estimated from the predicted
probabilities of 2 probit models for being an individual in group 1, one conditional on x
and z and the other conditional on z alone.
Having g(x|z) on hand, the average value of the transformation 11+g(x|z) across group 1
individuals, will then give the synthetic index (6)38.
A.2 Adaptation to our setting
In our analysis we define D as a dummy taking value 1 if the individual is female
(disadvantaged group) and 0 otherwise. We consider two x variables, xk , k = 1, 2 :
- x1 : dummy taking value 1 if the individual is inactive, and 0 if active (participation
rate);
2014, 3:18
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/18
Cipollone et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 37 of 40
- x2 : dummy taking value 1 if the active individual is employed, and 0 if
unemployed (unemployment rate).
We use as control variables z the individual education level, marital status, partner
education, number of children and age.
We thus derive two synthetic indicators (activity index and employment index) for each
European country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP) and between 2004-2009
(EU-SILC) and we perform t-test statistics to assess any significant difference between the
beginning and the end of the observed time window. Tables in Additional file 1 collects
the complete list of results.
B Appendix 2
B.1 An algebraic decomposition
Let us consider model (3):
ytij = βt0j + βt11jCHILDtij + βt12jELDERLY tij + β2′xt2ij + εtij
where
βt0j = δ0 + δ1INSTtj + δ2POLtj + νtj
βt11j = γ10 + γ11INSTtj + γ12POLtj + υt1j
βt12j = γ20 + γ21INSTtj + γ22POLtj + υt2j
For simplicity of exposition, let us define xt1ij as a vector of individual characteris-
tics whose impact depends on macro-factors (which in our model 3 include CHILD and
ELDERLY ).
We obtain
ytij = βt0j +
(
xt1ij
)
′βt1j +
(
xt2ij
)
′βt2j + εtij (10)
with
βt0j = δt0 +
(
zt1ij
)
′δt1 + νtj
βt1j = γ t0 +
(
zt1ij
)
′γ t1 + υtj
Hence
ytij = δt0 +
(
ztj
)
′δt1 +
(
xt1ij
)
′γ t0 +
(
xt1ij
)
′γ t1
(
ztj
)
′+
(
xt2ij
)
′βt2 + Rtjt (11)
with
(
xt1ij,βt1j, γ t0 , υt1j
)
asm×1 vectors;
(
xt2ij,βt2
)
as n×1 vectors;
(
ztj , δt1
)
as p×1 vectors,
and γ t1 as p × m matrix. The residual Rtjt includes both the random component νtj +(
xt1ij
)
′υtj and the error term εtij.
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Let us take first-differences
ytij−yt−1ij =
(
δt0 − δt−10
)
+
[(
ztj
)
′
(
δt1 − δt−11
)
+
(
ztj − zt−1j
)
′δt−11
]
(12)
+
[(
xt1ij
)
′
(
γ t0 − γ t−10
)
+
(
xt1ij − xt−11ij
)
′γ t−10
]
+
[(
xt2ij
)
′
(
βt2 − βt−12
)
+
(
xt2ij − xt−12ij
)
′βt−12
]
+
[(
xt1ij
)
′ (γ t1 − γ t−11 ) ′ztj +
(
xt1ij
)
′ (γ t−11 ) ′ztj−
(
xt−11ij
)
′ (γ t−11 ) ′zt−1j
]
+
[
Rtjt − Rt−1jt
]
Model (12) is equivalent to Stoker (1985), which decomposes the change of an aggregate
variable (here the proportion of women who participate) into a change of the behavioural
micro model (coefficients of (11) for a series of cross-sections) and a change in the dis-
tribution of the micro variables (education, fertility, marital status, etc.). Since our aim
is to quantify the role of changes in macro-factors on female decisions, we impose that
the coefficient estimates of model (12) do not vary over time. In this way, we are able to
use our multilevel model (3) to determine what portions of changes in behaviour over
time depends on changes in policy regulations39. In other words, we apply the following
restrictions to model (12):
• δt0 = δt−10 = δ¯0;
• βt2 = βt−12 = β¯2;
• γ t0 = γ t−10 = γ¯0;
• γ t1 = γ t−11 = γ¯1;
• δt1 = δt−11 = δ¯1;
• δt0 = δt−10 = δ¯0.
The simplified model is
ytij−yt−1ij =
[(
xt2ij − xt−12ij
)
′β¯2
]
(13)
+
[(
ztj − zt−1j
)
′δ¯1 +
(
ztj − zt−1j
)
′γ¯ 1
(
xt−11ij
)]
+
[(
xt1ij − xt−11ij
)
′γ¯ 0 +
(
zt1ij
)
′γ¯ 1
(
xt1ij − xt−11ij
)]
+
[
Rtjt − Rt−1jt
]
≡  individual characteristics x2whose effect does not depend on macro factors z
+  in macro factors z
+ individual characteristics x1whose effect depends on macro factors z (14)
+ residual component
Additional file
: Synthetic indicator: complete list of results.
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